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SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE RULE OF LAW
Sri Devi Venkatasamy
The Formalist School
It is surprising that judges, who are expected to make complex and important decisions every day, have
written so little about the process by which they arrive at the decision. Perhaps one important reason was
the declaratory theory of judicial decision-making,' according to which, the role of the judges in
construing the Constitution or a statute was simply that of a vector declaring the intention of the
legislature that made that law. ' Similarly, in common law, it was believed that the judge was doing no
more than applying logical reasoning to previous judicial authority. This belief was the cornerstone of
the Formalist theory of the judicial decision-making process.' The Formalists contended that even
judicial opinion was capable of being broken down into a three-part equation. The equation
propounded by the Formalists consists of the rules of law (R), the facts of the case (F), and the decision
of the judge (D). This would be represented by the formula R x F = D.5 As indicated by the formula,
the Formalists' equation relies exclusively on the existence of the law. The rule of Law, as established by
precedent or statutory authority, is the uniform portion of this equation, which guides the judge's
decision. Once ascertained, the rule is then exactly applied to the case after the judge has examined and
determined the relevant facts. Therefore, the Formalist theory placed great faith on the comprehensive
coverage of both common and statutory law, as well as the ability of a judge to pinpoint the applicable
rule of law in forming a conclusion." The Formalist theory of decision-making is that the judicial
decision is the conclusion reached at by the application of the above formula. A clear implication of the
Formalist theory is that the judge's conclusion should also be reached by any other jurist using the same
formula under similar circumstances. Thus, the Formalist approach views the judge as one who
objectively and impersonally decides cases by a process of logical deduction from a definite and
consistent body of rules. This approach appears ideal as the decision making process is objective and
rules have a central role in the decision making process, restricting the discretion vested in the judges. Yet,
the fundamental belief that the Formalist approach relies on, that the judicial decision is really a mere
apphcation of a simple formula, appears questionable. This can be best explained by the following
examples.
Consider the sale of a painting by an auction house for a bid of Rs. 10,000. When the buyer has the
painting appraised, it turns out to be a lost masterpiece worth millions. Upon learning this, the auction
house sues to rescind the contract of sale. A rule of law exists that a contract may be rescinded when

111 Year, B.A., LL.B.(Hons.) Student, National Law School of India University.
According to Blackstone, who was one of the most influential exponents of this theory, exercise of judicial
power required the judge to determine the law arising upon the facts of the case, In determining the law, the
judge is not expected to pronounce or make a new law, but is expected to expound and maintain the old law This
was acknowledged as the declaratory theory of decision-making. BLACKSTONE, CONIMENTARIE5 13 (1765).
Justice Michael Kirby, Judging: Rellnions on lbe moment of dedsion, at hitp://wwwcsu.edn/confIeruc/decisionmaking.html (last visited December 10, 2000).

LId
DENNis LivAn, NTRoDLcnoN ToJURJS1RLDENCE 655 (1985).
Timothy J. Capurso, How Jjues Judge: Theoner on Judidal Dedrion-Making, at
judgesjudge.htm (last visited December 18, 2000),
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there has been a mutual mistake concerning a material fact. If the contract was for the sale of an
inexpensive painting, there was clearly a mutual mistake. However, if the contract was for the sale of a
work of unknown value, there was not. The reason is that rules are often expressed in such vague
language (e.g., "reasonable", "due process", "fair value", etc.) as to allow them to be read as narrowly or
as broadly as necessary to achieve any desired result."
Consider for instance, a woman living in a rural setting who becomes ill and calls her family physician for
help. He is the only local doctor but it is the doctor's day off and he does not respond because he has a
golf date. The woman's condition worsens; no other physician can be procured in time; as a result, she
dies. Her estate then sues the doctor for not coming to her aid. A rule of law exists that, in the absence
of an actual contract for services, there can be no liability. However, another rule holds that, in the
absence of an explicit contract, the law will apply a contractual relationship when that is necessary to
avoid injustice. The reason is that the law is riddled with contradictory rules, so that a judge will always
have a choice between competing rules leading to opposing outcomes.'
The Realist School
The existence of contradictory rules and rules that give wide scope for interpretation are the reasons for
questioning the Formalist theory. The Realist school emphasizes on what courts may do, rather than on
abstract logical deduction from rules.' Realism focuses attention on the empirical factors that underlie a
judicial decision."' Karl Llewellyn, a rule sceptic", in his 1931 defence of Realism against Roscoe Pound,
summarized the principal beliefs of the Realists, and, while doing so, explained the crux of the Realist
viewpoint on rule scepticism as being the distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they
purport to describe what either courts or people are actually doing; and the distrust of the idea that rules
as expressed in the form of legal doctrine are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions.' 2
Realists believe that the heavily operative factor in judicial decision-making is not rules, but empirical
factors like the philosophy, temperament, and opinion of the judge. The contradictory nature of rules
and the vague language in which rules are expressed enable the judge to justify any decision in terms of
rules and concepts. Thereby, Jerome Frank, a leading Realist scholar, maintains that the opinions written
by the judiciary are an inaccurate description of actual thought processes that occur in a judge's mind.
The judgment is perceived as being little more than the "mere intellectuaigation orjustfication of thejugei

John Hasnas Bark to the Fere: Fram Crideal Lgal ShAes forawrd to 14d Reaksm, or how nod to misr the ptait of the
indetemiinacy argument, 45 DL K. L. J. 84, 85 (1995),
Id Through these examples, John Hasnas questions the belief that the judicial decision can be arrived ar, in a
simple and direct manner, by the application of the appropriate rule to the given fact situation. The problem, as
can be seen by the examples, is that the appropriate rule cannot be determined as easily as the Formalists
purported it so be.
Lloyd, supra note 4, at 658. The general intellectual movement in favor of Realism as against Formalism perhaps
reached its heyday by the end of the 1920s. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes greatly influenced the Realist
movement and much of the characteristics of the Realist school were seen as reflections of Holmes' views ot
law as being what the courts may decide.
1-IsHotss, THE CoMOmn. LAw 35 (1921).
1
SeeJromF FRANK, COURTS O-N TRIA. 26 (1949). There are two groups of realists: rule sceptics and fact sceptics. Rule
sceptics believe that the legal uncertainty in decision-making is due to the contradictory nature of rules and the
existence of rules that give wide scope for interpretation. Fact sceptics believe that the unpredictability of court
decisions lies primarily in the elusiveness of facts,
a Karl Llewelly n, Some Realirm abtea Rear. - Reponding to Dean Pound, 44 HAnIy. L. REv. 1222, 1237 (1930-1931).
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dewjrs." It may seem strange that the contention that rules have a central place in the structure of a legal
system could ever be seriously doubted. H.L.A. Hart believed that the sceptic's conception of what it is
for a rule to exist is an unattainable ideal. Consequently, when he discovers this, he expresses his
disappointment by the denial that there are, or can be, any rules." Thus, just as the rules which the
judges claim bind them in deciding a case, have an open texture, or have exceptions that are not
exhaustively specifiable in advance," the rule sceptic believes that rules do not have a central place in the
structure of a legal system. However, at no point do rule sceptics like Llewellyn deny that the elements
of legal doctrine such as rules and concepts are important matters of analysis.' 7 Llewellyn distinguished
between "realmles and nghtr? and "paper mles and ights". He conceived real rules in terms of behaviour
and as the practices of the court. He stated that paper rules were what have been treated traditionally as
rules of law. Thus, in Llewellyn's view, sensitivity to the courts' work, as well as the way judges
rationalize their actions through legal rules and principles, ought to cause a cautious and critical view of
legal doctrine." A number of factors likely to influence judicial decisions are direct influences such as
legal and political experiences, political affiliations, intellectual opinions, and temperamental traits; and
indirect and remote influences such as legal and general education, family and personal associations?

The Rule of Law
Rule scepticism appears to question the ideal of the rule of law. The ideal of the rule of law is often
expressed by the phrase ",goternment by law and not by men"". EA.Hayek defines the ideal of rule of law
more precisely and clearly as:
"Striped of all technicalilies, mle of law means that gowiment in all its actions is bound by
rm/es fixed and announced beforehand - rules which make itpossible to foresee with fair certainfy
how the authority nill use its coerciv power in ginan circomstances, and to plan one's individual
affairs on the basis of this knowledge."
Rule of law requires rules to be fixed and announced beforehand, te., law has to be prospective in
nature? The framers of the American Constitution, for instance, forbade the Congress to pass any ex
FRANK, LAw AND TFrw MooERN MIND 35 (1930). Frank stated that the judges' decisions are not based on a
systematic analysis of fact and law, but rather on an intuitive flash which he termed 'Yndidal buch" According to
Frank, "lltwewer produces te judge' hwuch makes 1h laW'. The '>ndidal hunch" is a reaction in response to an internal
emotional impulse of the judge. The impulse is due to the biases and preconceptions of the judges.
F.1-LA.HART, THE CoNcEPr OF LAw 133 (1961).
Id at 124. Whichever devicc, precedent, or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of
behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point, where
their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an "open exlem".
As the exceptions to a rule are not exhaustively specified in advance, the judge may create an exception, and mar
also decide that the situation in the case before the court falls within the created exception.
ROGER COTERErL, THE. POTATICS tOPJURISPRLDENCE 191 (1989). In this context, Cotterell relies on a statement made by

JEROsi

"

Karl Llewellyn. LIewellyn stated, "I feel sdmtq4 Ie omunwdome
when tuming the spothbt on behaviour, of lbrnw orbhoaerd the
emepbasis
on nibs, conept, ideology, and ideologica/ stereoepe or paesrns... a jmripmedence which aes pradically nvrkable Could nol
bave beenbuit jet enier of nbs and concep if they bad sn contained a good core ofInth and sense"
' See Karl Uewellyn, A Realirdc Jnisprdence - The Next Step, 30 Cor..
L REv. 431, 449 (1930).
Llewellyn, supra note 12.
* Capurso, supra note 5.

Jossei RAz, THE AUTrHoRIn Or L,%, 212 (1979).
-i Ut.., THiE RooA To Ssmsoosi 54(1944).
According to Joseph Raz, the rule of law has two aspects - that people should be ruled by the law and obey it, and
that the law should be such that people will be able to be guided by it. Therefore, the law has to be prospectivc
for if it is to guide people, they must know what it is. Supra note 21, at 215.

1 FA
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post facto law.' The cornerstone of rule scepticism is distrust that rules describe what the courts are
doing. Although rules are fixed and announced beforehand, the way in which the court will apply the
rules is not clear until the court actually applies the rules. Therefore, despite fixing the rules, the purpose
of fixing and announcing the rules beforehand is defeated, as it amounts to retrospecnivity. As Llewellyn
bad pointed out, real rules are the practices of the court, i.e., the manner in which the courts apply the
rules, and it is only when the court applies them that they are in truth fixed and announced.2 ' Ronald
Dworkin's criticism of the legal positivist theory of discretion is similar?' The judge, according to this
theoryr has the discretion to decide the case when it cannot be brought under a clear rule of law"t
However, according to Dworkin, in reality, he legislates new legal rights, and then applies them
retrospectively to the case at hand. When the rules are, in truth, fixed only when the court applies them,
one is not aware of the rules beforehand, and this leads to uncertainty? Rule scepticism is concerned
with the proposition that judicial decisions cannot be predicted from the paper rules perse, and the result
is uncertainty. According to Dicey, no man can be lawfully made to suffer except for a distinct breach of
law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. "' In this sense,
every system of government based on the exercise of wide and arbitrary powers by persons in authority
is contrary to the rule of law." The focus of Dicey's definition of rule of law is that it is contrary to
arbitrary power. Joseph Raz agrees and states that the rule of law is often rightly contrasted with
arbitrary power? The rule of law excludes all forms of arbitrary power in the law-applying function of
the judiciary, where the courts are required to be subject only to the law, and to conform to the
procedures) 3 Rule scepticism argues that this seems to be in direct conflict with the rule of law in this
sense. Rule sceptics argue that the judges are not really subject to the law, as the nature of rules is such
that they can be used to appear as if the judges have acted in accordance with binding rules, whereas in

KCVHFARF, MoFnOR Co',srr-no s 8 (1951).
Sa* rtAndl Ilewellyn, aptra note 18.
RONALD D owins., TAIGG RiGHTs Saiousi 81 (1999).
Stee HART, ssro note 14, at 133 and id Hart, for instance, relied on rules and believed that indetcrminacy exist%

only in the penumbra of cases, due to the open texture of rules. Therefore, in hard cases, the judge is said to
have the discretion to decide the case either way. According to Dworkin, the judge is in reality legislaiung new
legal rights which are then applied retrospectively to the case in question although the language used by the
judge seems to assume that one or the other party had a pre-existing right. Dworkin states that the judge ought
not to legislate retrospectively but should refer to the principles and policies which law comprises of, besides
rules. In this context, Dworkin is referring solely to hard cases, it., cases where the rule is said to be unclear, as
is Harn. Positivists believe that the theory of discretion is applicable only in hard cases. In other cases, which,
according to the positivists, are the majority of the cases, the rules are clear. However, the rule sccpiics state that
in every case, due to the contradictory nature of rules, the legal right is not clear, as the rule to be applied is not
clear. Therefore, the judge, when he chooses to apply one rule over another rule, is legislating and applying the
rules retrospectively, as, according to the rule sceptics, the real rules are formed only when the rules are applied

by the courts
Se gareral RAx, s"pna note 21.
According to Joseph R2n, when people are unable to foresce the law, it leads to uncertainty, which is a violation
of the rule of law. The rule of law in its broadest sense means that people should obey the law and be ruled bv
it. Uncertainty thereby affects the rule of law in its broadest sense, for if people are not cenain as to what the
law is, they cannot obey it. Rn, rspr note 21
AM. Dicay, At INTRoDUcnoN TO THE Snimt OrTHE LAr Or THE .)nNsnaUTON 188 (1990).

iii

RAz, apm note 21, at 219.
Li
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truth, it is the "judicial hunch"34 which led to the decision. The vast discretionary power of the judges
provides a wide scope for the arbitrary use of power.

Rule Scepticism and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Rule scepticism questions the doctrine of separation of powers, which is based on the ideal of the rule
of law According to the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature alone can formulate laws,
whereas the judiciary is required to apply the law However, rule sceptics state that judges do not merely
apply the law laid down by the legislature." In fact, the rule sceptics go so far as to say that the paper
rules are the rules created by the legislature and the real rules are the rules, which the courts choose to
apply.' They suggest that doctrine is less important than those who create it; that what judges do is
more important than the reasoning with which they justify their decision. The full extent of judicial
power to develop law through creative interpretation can be recognized as a practical matter. Indeed,
judges and courts, viewed merely as decision-makers determining disputes, might not look very
different in character from administrative regulators or legislative rule-makers. The fact that appellate
judges make law, and not merely interpret it, is now fuly acknowledged although there are many,
including the appellate judges, who still contest this proposition.38
In this context, the doctrine of judicial review has been the subject matter of emotionally surcharged
debate, the extreme charge being that in the name of interpretation, the judges arrogate to themselves
the role of legislator.39 According to Justice D.A.Desai, this is an unavoidable outcome of the power of
judicial review." In the decision making process, when the judge tailors the law to suit the facts of the

FsRAck,upm note 13.
3Jewellyn, nipra note 11.
Llewellyn, apra note 18.

aHv
S,
rprm note 22, at 183,184.
U, Baxi, On te shame of not bang an araist Thoughtr on Juddal Adhi.rm, 11 IBR 259, 259 (1984). According to Baxi,
judges naturally indulge themselves in the honest fiction that they are merely carrying out the intention of
the legislators, He further states that the nature of law is such that it allows the judge to do so Baxi terms this
persistent attempt to convince people that judges do not make law as "the Grat Blacksonian Lie". In keeping
with the Lie, appellate judges continue to contest the acknowledged proposition that they sometimes make
the law In this context, Baxi points out several instances when the appellate judges clearly made law One
such instance is the amendment of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to
maintenance wherein the Muslim spouses were excluded, not because the system of mebr was considered to
be adequate maintenance, but because the ruling political coalition government was apprehensive of
alienating the Muslim male-dominated constituencies In this particular instance, Justice VR. Krishna Iyer
interpreted the relevant provisions so as to ensure that they would also be applicable to Muslim women. By
doing so, Justice Krishna lycer actually reversed the specifically desired legislative exclusion.
Another instance pointed out by Baxi is the manner in which Justice P.N. Bhagwati was instrumental in
evolving a unique form of epistolary jurisdiction through which public citizens or groups could approach
the Supreme Court for violation of the fundamental rights of the ethnic and other minorities in the Indian
societ
AnY citizen could now approach the court, even by means of a letter, which could be treated as a
writ petition, the traditional law relating to lAws s/rndi thus underwent a fundamental change.
Justice D.A. Desai, Justice anrooiadg to law is a myth, 11 IBR 237, 238 (1984).
Justice Desai states two reasons for this unavoidable outcome: firstly, when a judge progressively interprets
the law with a view to resolving the controversy before the court, the judge has to determine the object for
which the law has been enacted, There will then be a grey area about the intention or object of the statute,
which allows the judge to legislate interstitially; secondly, when a law is enacted, the social conditions of the
period during which the law was enacted determine the object which the law seeks to achieve. When the
social conditions change, but the law remains unchanged by corresponding amendments, the judge, who is
influenced by the prevailing circumstances, acts in accordance with the altered circumstances.

72

Sceptical about the Riule of Law
case before him, he does legislate interstitially to some extent, and when he does so, he is unconsciously
influenced by his own social philosophy.4 ' In State of Bibar v MabarajadhirajaKamresbwar Singh, the
constitutional validity of the Bihat Land Reforms Act, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary
Rights Act, and the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was challenged. The aim
of these enactments was to promote land reforms. However, Section 23 of the Bihar Land Reforms
Act, which provided for the computation of net income of a proprietor or tenure holder, was held void
on the ground that it had been fixed in an arbitrary manner.43 According to Justice Desai, the five-judge
Constitution Bench was influenced by their background and by their social philosophy that private
property was sacrosanct.Judicial Activism
Judicial activism explicitly proves the point of the rule sceptics. In judicial activism, it is clear that the rule
was formulated when the court applied it. At the end of his judicial career, in Vellore Citizens Wefare
Forum v. Union of Inda, (1996) 5 SCC 647, justice Kuldip Singh, held that the tannery industries were
required to pay compensation on the basis of the "polkiterpays" principle. In this context, he stated that
as the principle was an accepted principle of customary international law, and as it was not contrary to the
municipal law, it was to be incorporated into domestic law' Justice Kuldip Singh, after referring to the
principles evolved in various international conferences, and to the concept of sustainable development,
stated that the precautionary principle, the "polluterpqys" principle', and the special concept of onus of
proof had now emerged in India as well, and that this was clear from Articles 47, 48-A, and 51-A(g) of
the Constitution of India and that, in fact, in the various environmental statutes, such as the Water

For instance, Justice Kuldip Singh was known to be pro-environment, and was called the "green judge" by the

media.
AIR 1952 SC 252.
According to PP Rao, the decision of the Parna High Court is said to have come as a rude shock to the framers of
the Constitution whose mindset was different.
Speaking on the Draft Constitution, Jawaharlal Nehru had said in the Constituent Assembly on 10-9-1949:
"The poliy of the aboliswn of hig riaes ir not a new policy hi one that mss laid down by the National Congressyear ago. So far as
at are concerned ", ad an connected mith ibe Congess, sha4 natuara1, gi effect to thai plege malete - one handm per cent - and
no legal snktley, no change, is going to caome
in our ny. That is quite dar [Fe mill hononr our pldges. Within liits, no Judge and no
Supreme Court will be alowed to coshluit themse/es into a third chamber. No Sqpreme Couri and no juinary ad/ si in judgment
our the sovereign till of Pariament aidch represents te illq of the entire cmmnunity. If a go wrong here and there, they can point it
out; but in the limate anafnr, where the fi/y
of the commonity is ancerned, no judary mst come in the way Ulineatek, the
koleConstilion is a rature of Parideent."
FP.Rao, Basic Featres of the Constuion, (2000) 2 SCC (our) 1.
"
Dessi, supro note 39. Justice Desai also points out that the history of the expression "mmpensation" in Article 31.
commencing from the decisions in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (AIR 1954 SC 92), Dtate of Wst Bengal v.
Beda Banerjee (AIR 1954 SC 170), K.K.osbai v. State of Madras (AIR 1960 SC 80) upto LCGolaknath vt State of Pnjab
(AIR 1967 SC 1643), which necessitated the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments of the Constitution, clearly
shows that the property-oriented judges strove valiantly to protect private property and in order to do so, set at
naught the Constitutional Amendments.
* In international la; a distinction is often made between hard and soft law. Hard international law generally refers
to agreements or principles that are directly enforceable by a national or international body. Soft international law
refers to agreements or principles that are meant to influence individual nations to respect certain norms or
incorporate them into national law. Although these agreements sometimes oblige countries to adopt
implementing legislation, they are not usually enforceable on their own in a court. Interestingly, the '"oilter pay]
principle and the precautionary principle are considered a part of soft international law.
" Interestingly, Justice Kuldip Singh, referred to his own judgement in The Bichii Case (Indian Condl for Emtire-Legal
Action vs. Union of lndia, 1996 (3) SCC 212) and stated that the "poihter pay] principle had been held to be a sound
"

principle by the Supreme Court.
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(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, and other statutes, including the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986, these concepts were already implied. Thus, judges do decide, not on the basis of
the existing rule, but on the basis of extraneous factors such as their favoured philosophy. Even Hart,
who was critical of the rule sceptics and believed that they wished to create a "beatn ofwnpt/' states
that rule scepticism has a serious claim on our attention as a theory of the function of rules in judicial
decision.'
Judges may even experience feelings of compulsion when they decide as they do, and these feelings may
also be predictable; but beyond that, there is nothing that can be characterized as a rule that they
observe.' Consider once again the situation of the woman living in a rural setting, who becomes ill on
the doctor's day off? As contradictory rules govern the situation, a judge will have a choice between
competing rules leading to opposing outcomes. Yet, the judge may even experience feelings of
compulsion and will act with sufficient predictable regularity. The feelings of compulsion are induced
not by the binding nature of the rules, but are more likely to be induced by the prevalent social
philosophy of the judges of that period. If the prevalent belief is that medicine is a noble profession,
and that doctors who are lifesavers cannot be considered at fault for natural human weaknesses, the case
will be decided in favour of the doctor. However, if the prevalent belief is that doctors are service
providers who ought to know that any deficiency is a matter of life and death, the case will be decided
against the doctor. It is not that the law and the prevalent belief are two different notions. The law is
enacted in accordance with the prevalent belief. However, it may happen that the circumstances may
change, but that the law may not be amended correspondingly? The judge would then tend to decide
in accordance with the prevalent beliefs of the current period and not the prevalent beliefs of the period
in which the law was enacted. For instance, in the United States, in the Dred Scott Case, slavery was
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. Nearly a century later, in sharp contrast to the
decision in that case, the Court unanimously held in Brown v. Board of Educahonai that segregated
education was inherently unequal. The same Constitution that permitted the judges to approve slavery
in the Dred Sott Cae, permitted an interpretation, a century later, which condemned the segregated
education between blacks and whites, as inherently unequal, and, therefore, wholly unjust.
Illustrations given by Chipman Gray, considered one of the fathers of the Realist movement, from
English and American legal history, show how political sympathy, economic theories and other personal
qualities of particular judges have settled matters of grave importance? The idea of Realism, a
"movement in thosght and work about the lan'", was to place the judge in the centre of the law. This was
because the decision-making process is such that when the judge applies the law to the facts in
controversy before him, he does legislate to some extent. It is indeed the legislature that legislates and
creates the rules to be applied. However, when the judge chooses between conflicting rules, it is the
judge who has decided and in effect created the rule that is to be applied. Thus, the judge does legislate

'

HAT,n*m note 14, at

135.

Mpai nate 8.
Desai, spm note 39.
DredScowv. San4'ord 60 US. 393 (1857).
" Brsnsv Roord of Edeaion, 347 US. 483 (1954).
W FRiNiN, LEGAL THEORY 293 (1944).
* Ucwellyn, spra note 12, at 1223.
SHasnas,

"
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to some extent when he exercises the power of selection between conflicting rules and precedents. Hart
attributed this to the open texture of the law." While Hart accepted that there were grey areas where the
judges legislated, Dworkin goes further to say that even where there is a hard case where no settled rule
dictated a decision either way, the decision should be generated by either policy or principle, and that the
judge should not legislate legal rights retrospectively.s" Hart viewed law as consisting solely of rules, and
realizing that there are cases where the rule to be applied is not clear, stated that in such cases, the judge
had the discretion to decide. However, according to Dworkin, law consists of principles and policies as
well, and when there is no settled rule binding the judge to decide either way, the judge ought to refer to
the principles and policies of law and decide accordingly. If the judge does not do so, Dworkin considers
the judge to be legislating new legal rights that he ought not to do. Llewellyn also believed that if a
particular legal rule proved to be indeterminate in a particular case, the decision of the court did not have
to be only the judge's legally uncontrolled choice." The illusion that the judge is forced to legislate in the
absence of a determinate legal rule is due to the failure to realize that legal decision-making is against a
background of well-established rules, principles, standards, and values. Although the Realists may be
sceptical about the binding and determinate nature of rules, they do not argue that the judge is forced to
legislate." Hart said, in conclusion, that there are two extremes, the Nightmare (the view that the judges
never find and always make the law) and the Noble Dream (the opposing view that they never make it).
The truth, perhaps unexciting, is that sometimes judges do one and sometimes the other. It is not, of
course, a matter of indifference but of great importance, which of these they do, and when, and how
they do it.I The Realists were sceptics but not non-believers. They stressed the legislative opportunities
of the courts and attempted to dissipate the conventional belief that the judge mechanically applied the
rules to the given fact situation. It cannot be denied that some Realists were considered extreme in their
insistence that rules were what the courts did.' Yet, the underlying belief of the Realists was that one
should be sceptical, although not always dismissive, of the claim that binding rules and precedents alone
determined the decision of the court. Thus, the Realists served to fundamentally alter the conceptions
of legal reasoning that had so far been accepted.

s4PM note 14, at 132.
DwomauN, upe note 26, at 80-83.
HART,
"
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